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If the distribution of organs becomes subject to the success of individual 
publicity campaigns, with organs going to those who hire the best PR firms 
and lawyers, who on the waiting list would remain confident that their 
priority would be decided on the merits . . . [a]nd who would agree to donate 
organs to a system supposedly based on rational, humane, and fair selection 
criteria but that would actually be determined by the assets of the highest 
bidder?1 
 
* University of California, Hastings College of the Law, J.D. Candidate, 2015.  Special thanks to 
Professor Robert Schwartz for his insight and guidance. 
 1.  Brett Norman, Will Girl’s Transplant Hurt System?, POLITICO (June 12, 2013, 08:06 
PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/sarah-murnaghan-organ-transplant-policy-92694. 
html (quoting Daniel Wikler, medical ethics expert at Harvard). 
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I. Introduction 
You have been diagnosed with organ failure and told you need an organ 
transplant to live.  You are placed on the transplant waiting list knowing that 
there is a real risk you may die prior to receiving an organ transplant, your 
last hope for survival.  You hear the story of a millionaire receiving an organ 
transplant in a state far from his home shortly after being listed . . . and two 
children being placed on an adult list to receive lung transplants . . . you 
think, how can that be?  Can I be placed on additional waitlists to increase 
my options and chances of obtaining an organ transplant? 
Organ transplantation has been a life-saving treatment option for many 
who require this intervention due to organ failure.  However, there are many 
legal and ethical considerations regarding allocation of this limited resource.  
Some of these issues were brought to the forefront in the highly publicized 
cases of Steve Jobs, Sarah Murnaghan, and Javier Acosta.2  These were 
instances where it appeared that in getting their transplants, these individuals 
obtained an unfair advantage over others on the waitlist.  When a resource is 
as scarce as an organ for transplantation, equitable distribution policies are 
integral to a just allocation system. 
The late Steve Jobs obtained a liver transplant in Tennessee, despite 
being a resident of California.3  Jobs was able to obtain a transplant in 
Tennessee because the transplant policies allow individuals to join multiple 
waitlists.4  However, not everyone has the same ability to access multiple 
waitlists due to the financial burden of going through an evaluation at each 
transplant center, and the inability to travel far distances at a moment’s 
notice.5 
In the case of the children, Sarah Murnaghan and Javier Acosta, both 
were suffering from end-stage cystic fibrosis and required lung transplants 
in order to survive.6  Since the availability of adult organs far exceeds the 
 
 2.  Kaja Whitehouse, Jobs Doctor’s House Deal Raises Eyebrows, NEW YORK POST (Dec. 10, 2013, 
1:26 AM), http://nypost.com/2013/12/10/house-deal-by-steve-jobs-doctor-raises-eyebrows/.; Lauran 
Neergaard, Challenging the Transplant System: Ruling That Allows Dying Child to Jump Waiting List Stirs 
National Debate, NATIONAL POST (June 7, 2013, 2:44 PM), http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/06/07/sarah-
murnaghan-and-javier-acosta-organ-transplant-rulings-stir-debate/. 
 3.  Whitehouse, supra note 2, at 1. 
 4.  See OPTN Policies § 3.4G, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. (Mar. 7, 2014), 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Policies.pdf#nameddest=Policy 
_5_Organ_Offers_Acceptanc. 
 5.  See infra Part III.B. See also William Saletan, How Did Steve Jobs Get His Liver?, 
SLATE (Jan. 19, 2011 8:55 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_nature 
/2011/01/how_did_steve_jobs_get_his_liver.html. 
 6.  Michelle Castillo, Bronx Boy Who Challenged Child Lung Transplant Rules Receives 
Organs, CBSNEWS.COM (Dec. 31, 2013, 1:38 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/bronx-boy-
who-challenged-child-lung-transplant-rules-receives-organs/. 
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availability of pediatric organs7 by as much as fifty times more,8 the parents 
of these children sought to set aside the United Network of Organ Sharing 
(UNOS) prohibition against children being placed on the adult transplant 
waitlist.9  Through judicial intervention, these children were able to obtain a 
temporary restraining order (TRO) against the UNOS “under age twelve 
rule” so that they could be considered for adult lungs based on the medical 
urgency of their cases.10  In granting the TROs for these children, Judge 
Baylson held that the under twelve rule “discriminates against children and 
serves no purpose, is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.”11  
Ultimately both children received adult lungs that they may not have 
otherwise received.12  The cases of these children received much publicity 
and ultimately led to a temporary policy change at the Organ Procurement 
and Transplantation Network (OPTN).13  The policy change is due to expire 
July 2014 but is being considered for permanent adoption.14 
The public sentiment was that any parent would do the same if faced 
with the circumstances Sarah Murnaghan and Javier Acosta’s parents were.15  
However, as Secretary Sebelius of the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) stated at the time, it was an “incredibly agonizing situation 
where someone lives and someone dies.”16  Sebelius also noted that there 
 
 7.  Ryan Jaslow, Children Added to Adult Lung Transplant List Amid Outcry a Dilemma for 
Doctors, CBSNEWS.COM (July 8, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/children-added-to-
adult-lung-transplant-list-amid-outcry-a-dilemma-for-doctors/ (Marlie Hall presenting) (reporting 
that in 2012 there were twenty lung donors under the age of twelve while there were 1700 adult 
lung donors). 
 8.  Janet & Francis Murnaghan v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 13-3083 (E.D. 
Pa. June 5, 2013) (order granting temporary restraining order); Janet & Francis Murnaghan v. U.S. 
Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 13-3083 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 2013) (supplemental memo); 
Milagros Martinez v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 13-3119 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 2013) 
(order granting temporary restraining order).  
 9.  E.g., Norman, supra note 1. 
 10.  Murnaghan TRO, supra note 8; Martinez, supra note 8. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id.  See also Murnaghan supplemental memo, supra note 8. 
 13.  At-a-Glance: Proposal for Adolescent Classification Exception for Pediatric Lung 
Candidates, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., available at http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ 
PublicComment/pubcommentPropSub_345.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
 14.  See infra Part III.C.  See also At-a-Glance: Proposal for Adolescent Classification 
Exception for Pediatric Lung Candidates, supra note 13. 
 15.  Bethany Mandel, Organ Allocation Should be Done by Doctors, Not Judges, 
COMMENTARY(June 12, 2013 7:00 AM), http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2013/06/13 
/organ-allocation-should-be-done-by-doctors-not-judges/ (stating “One cannot help but feel the 
utmost sympathy for families like the Murnaghans as they watch, helplessly, as their child 
suffers.”). 
 16.  Sebelius Rejects 10-Year-Old Girl’s Appeal for Life-Saving Waiver From Federal 
Regulation, GRABIEN, https://grabien.com/file.php?id=5990&searchorder=summary (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2014). 
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were three other children in the same hospital under similar life-and-death 
circumstances17 and that there were forty others on the highest-acuity list in 
Pennsylvania at the time.18  As Dr. Stuart Sweet, medical director of the 
world’s largest pediatric lung transplant program in St. Louis stated, “‘the 
organ allocation system is designed to offer organs as fairly as possible for 
every patient waiting for organs’”19 and if the system is changed for one 
patient’s advantage, then there is another patient who will be at a 
disadvantage.20 
This note will address the inequities of the current organ transplant 
waitlist system.  Section II will begin with a review of the history of the 
organ transplant system in the United States.  Section III will examine the 
transplant waitlist process and organ allocation systems.  Sections IV and V 
will discuss options to consider in pursuit of achieving a more equitable 
organ transplant system. 
II. Background 
A. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 
The current mechanism for organ donation in the United States is 
through an anatomical gift.21  Prior to 1968, organ donation was handled at 
the state level and systems varied significantly from state-to-state.22  The 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) promulgated in 1968 by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was the first piece of 
legislation regarding organ transplantation in the United States, creating the 
power that was not yet recognized at common law to donate organs, eyes, 
and tissue as a gift.23  The UAGA was revised in 1987 and again in 2006.24  
 
 17.  Mandel, supra note 15. 
 18.  Sebelius Rejects 10-Year-Old Girl’s Appeal for Life-Saving Waiver From Federal 
Regulation, supra note 16. 
 19.  Robing Young and Jeremy Hobson, Dying Girl Sparks Debate Over Organ Transplants, 
NPR Here & Now, (May 30, 2013) available at http://hereandnow.wbur.org/2013/05/30/pediatric-
organ-transplants. 
 20.  Allahpundit, Sebelius: I can’t suspend the lung-transplant rules for a dying 10-year-old, 
HOT AIR (June 4, 2013 8:01 PM), http://hotair.com/archives/2013/06/04/sebelius-i-cant-suspend-
the-lung-transplant-rules-for-a-dying-10-year-old/. 
 21.  ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (2006) Summary, Unif. Law Comm’n, http://uniformlaws.org/ 
ActSummary.aspx?title=Anatomical Gift Act (2006) (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
 22.  Legislative, ASSOCIATION OF ORGAN PROCUREMENT ORGANIZATIONS, 
http://www.aopo.org/legislative-a33 (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
 23.  Timeline of Historical Events Significant Milestones in Organ Donation and 
Transplantation, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.organdonor.gov/ 
legislation/timeline.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2014); Legislative, supra note 22. 
 24.  Id. 
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All states had adopted the 1968 UAGA, but only twenty-six states enacted 
the 1987 revision resulting in non-uniformity amongst the states.25  The 
diversity in the law amongst the states was considered an impediment to 
transplantation.26  Thus, the 2006 revision was an attempt to increase 
efficiency of the organ transplant system by resolving perceived 
inconsistencies in the system and is limited in scope to donations from 
deceased donors.27  The 2006 revision has been adopted in every state except 
Delaware, New York, Florida, and Pennsylvania where it has been 
introduced for consideration this year.28 
The UAGA has three goals in mind including: (1) encouraging 
individuals to make anatomical gifts; (2) respecting the autonomy of 
individuals in deciding whether or not to make an anatomical gift; and (3) 
prohibiting the sale and purchase of organs.29 
B. National Organ Transplant Act 
In 1984 the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) was passed by 
Congress.30  NOTA prohibits the sale of human organs, established the 
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) to ensure fair and 
equitable allocation of donated organs, and provided grants to establish and 
expand organ procurement organizations (OPOs).31  The OPTN organizes 
the procurement, distribution, and transplantation of organs and is managed 
by a private non-profit organization, United Network for Organ Sharing 
(UNOS).32  OPTN is managed by UNOS through contract with the Health 
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) of the Department of Health 
and Human Services (DHHS) and has been the only organization managing 
 
 25.  ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, supra note 21. 
 26.  Unif. Anatomical Gift Act (2006) Prefatory Note 1, available at http://www. 
giftofhope.org/about_donation/pdf/2006_Revised_UAGA.pdf. 
 27.  ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, supra note 21. 
 28.  ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (2006), Enactment Map, Unif. Law Comm’n, 
http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Anatomical+Gift+Act+(2006) (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
 29.  Unif. Anatomical Gift Act (2006), supra note 26 at 2.  See Verheijde, Rady & McGregor, 
The United States Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (2006): New Challenges to Balancing 
Patient Rights and Physician Responsibilities, PHILOSOPHY, ETHICS, AND HUMANITIES IN 
MEDICINE (Sept. 12, 2007), http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/19#B7 (discussing the tension 
between the revised UAGA encouraging continued medical intervention to ensure suitability of 
organs for transplantation and the wishes of the deceased as indicated in advanced directives). 
 30.  Timeline of Historical Events, supra note 23. 
 31.  Id.; Selected Statutory and Regulatory History of Organ Transplantation, DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.organdonor.gov/legislation/legislationhistory.html (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
 32.  Furrow, Greaney, Johnson, Jost & Schwartz, Health Law: Cases, Materials and Problems 
1487 (7th ed. 2013). 
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the OPTN since 1986 when it was first awarded the contract by DHHS.33  
UNOS and OPTN have a shared board of directors that includes medical 
professionals, regional representatives, and general public representatives.34 
Specifically, the OPTN board must include fifty-percent transplant surgeons 
and physicians and at least twenty-five percent transplant candidates, 
transplant recipients, organ donors, and family members.35  The OPTN 
committees and its board of directors develop policies while UNOS 
coordinates committee and board actions.36 
OPTN is charged with establishing: (1) a national list of individuals in 
need of organs, either through regional centers or in one location; (2) a 
national system of organ matching; and (3) criteria for allocation of organs.37  
OPTN must also assist OPOs in equitable distribution of organs among 
transplant patients nationwide and work actively to increase the supply of 
donated organs.38 
All OPOs must participate in the OPTN39 and be certified by the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS).40  Additionally, all OPOs are members 
of the Association of Organ Procurement Organizations.41  Fifty-eight OPOs 
exist in the United States and are responsible for increasing the number of 
registered donors and coordinating the donation process when actual donors 
become available within their designated service area.42  Some states like 
Hawaii and Alabama have one OPO, while other states such as New York 
and Ohio have up to five OPOs.43  CMS conditions of participation require 
that any hospital involved in the procurement of organs must be a member 
of an OPO while a hospital that performs organ transplants must be a 
 
 33.  Id.; OPTN, UNOS, http://www.unos.org/donation/index.php?topic=optn (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2014); Organ Donation and Transplantation Save Lives, ORGANDONOR.GOV, 
http://www.organdonor.gov/about/index.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
 34.  OPTN/UNOS Board of Directors, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., http://optn.transplant. 
hrsa.gov/members/boardOfDirectors.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
 35.  42 C.F.R. § 121.3 (2014). 
 36.  Policy Management, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., http://optn.transplant. 
hrsa.gov/policiesAndBylaws/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
 37.  42 U.S.C. § 274 (2014).  See id. for a full listing of OPTN duties and responsibilities. 
 38.  Id.   
 39.  42 U.S.C. § 273 (2014).  
 40.  Organ Procurement Organizations, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://organdonor.gov/ 
materialsresources/materialsopolist.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
 41.  Id.; Members, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/members/ 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  See id. 
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member of the OPTN.44  These conditions of participation apply to heart, 
heart-lung, intestine, kidney, liver, lung, and pancreas centers.45 
The nation has been divided into eleven geographic regions by OPTN 









Figure 1 Regions, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/converge/members/regions.asp. 
Each region is represented on the OPTN/UNOS Board of Directors.47  These 
regions are further delineated into donation service areas (DSA) defined as 
“[t]he geographic area designated by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) that is served by one organ procurement organization 
(OPO), one or more transplant hospitals, and one or more donor hospitals.”48 
III. Waitlisting & Allocation Decisions 
A. The Dreaded Waitlist 
Despite the OPTN and OPOs being charged to increase the supply of 
donated organs, the gap between individuals in need of transplant and donors 
is widening.49 
 
 44.  42 C.F.R. § 482.45 (2014); 42 C.F.R. § 482.72 (2014).  See 42 C.F.R. § 482.104 for 
additional requirements for kidney transplant centers. 
 45.  42 C.F.R. § 482.68 (2014). 
 46.  Members, supra note 41. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  See, OPTN Policies § 1.2, Definitions, available at http://optn.transplant. 
hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Policies.pdf#nameddest=Policy_8_Allocation_of_Kidneys 
(last updated Mar. 7, 2014). 
 49.  The Need is Real: Data, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/about/ 
data.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
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There are over 120,000 candidates awaiting transplant50 and although 
an average of seventy-nine transplants are conducted daily, another eighteen 
individuals die due to organ shortages.51  Of those currently waiting for 
transplant, over 99,000 are waiting for kidneys.52  Transplant candidates are 
only placed on the waiting list for an organ at a transplant program if the 
transplant program has current OPTN transplant program approval for that 
organ type.53 
Figure 2 The Need is Real: Data, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/about/data.html. 
Currently there are 244 transplant centers nationwide.54  Determining 
whether an individual is a candidate for transplant at a given time varies 
amongst transplant centers across the country.55  That is because discretion 
is left to the medical professionals and individual hospitals in deciding when 
 
 50.  Data, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/data/ (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2014). 
 51.  The Need is Real: Data, supra note 49. 
 52.  Data, supra note 50. 
 53.  OPTN Policies § 3.4.B, Approved Transplant Program Requirement, available at  
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Policies.pdf#nameddest=Policy_8_ 
Allocation_of_Kidneys (last updated Mar. 7, 2014). 
 54.  Members, supra note 41. 
 55.  Furrow et al., supra note 32 at 1489. 
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to add a candidate to the list.56  Each center has its own criteria for listing 
transplant candidates.57  When an individual is referred to a transplant center  
for evaluation and placement on the transplant list the “transplant center runs 
a number of tests and considers the patient’s mental and physical health, as 
well as his or her social support system[]” prior to accepting or rejecting the 
individual for placement on the list.58  Transplant centers also ask about an 
individual’s financial situation, including insurance or other resources to pay 
for the surgery and immunosuppressant medication following 
transplantation.59  This means that an individual may be rejected for listing 
at one transplant center but accepted and placed on the list at another 
transplant center. 
B. Multiple Listing Quandary 
Transplant candidates are explicitly allowed to register at multiple 
transplant sites for the same organ.60 
Candidates may be registered for an organ at multiple transplant 
programs within the same Donation Service Area (DSA) or different DSAs. 
A transplant program may choose whether or not to accept a candidate 
seeking multiple registrations for an organ.  Transplant hospitals may access 
a report from the OPTN Contractor that identifies any candidates that have 
multiple registrations for the same organ. This report will not include the 
identities of the other hospitals where the candidates are registered.61 
It is this policy that allowed the late Steve Jobs to be placed on multiple 
lists for his liver transplant.  Similarly, the TRO that both Sarah Murnaghan 
and Javier Acosta obtained allowing them to be placed on the adult waitlist 
while still on the pediatric list was consistent with this policy. 
Much of the controversy surrounding multiple listing is that transplant 
centers do not have similar access to organs—“not all OPOs are created 
equal.”62  It is well established that hospitals vary widely in the number of 
 
 56.  Id.; How the Transplant System Works: Matching Donors and Recipients, UNOS, 
http://www.unos.org/donation/index.php?topic=fact_sheet_1 (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
 57.  Frequently Asked Questions, Transplant Living, http://www.transplantliving.org/ 
community/patient-resources/frequently-asked-questions/#donAwarenessHelp (last visited Mar. 
30, 2014). 
 58.  How the Transplant System Works: Matching Donors and Recipients, UNOS, 
http://www.unos.org/donation/index.php?topic=fact_sheet_1 (last visited Mar. 29, 2014). 
 59.  What Every Patient Needs to Know, United Network for Organ Sharing 7 (2013), 
https://www.unos.org/docs/WEPNTK.pdf. 
 60.  OPTN Policy § 3.4G, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. (Mar. 7, 2014), 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Policies.pdf. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Chad J. Wilson, Note, Working the System: Should Patients in Need of an Organ 
Transplant Be Able to Join Multiple Waitlists?, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 229, 242 (2011). 
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transplants they perform and that OPOs vary widely in the number and types 
of donors they receive each year.63  Some consider multiple listing as 
“gaming the system.”64  Not everyone can access multiple lists because 
[f]irst you have to show up for an extensive in-person evaluation.  Then 
you have to be available for a transplant in the area within hours of an organ 
becoming available.  And while one jurisdiction might accept you as a 
charity case, if you want to play the field you’ll have to prove you can pay 
for the transplant yourself.  You also get priority points for being able to 
guarantee follow-up medical care, since this assures transplant allocators that 
the organ will be well cared for.65, 66 
The American Medical Association (AMA) Council on Ethical and 
Judicial Affairs (CEJA) finds multiple listing problematic because “reliance 
on criteria of questionable ethical value may lead to inherently unfair or 
unjust allocation decisions” and “the different interpretations and valuations 
assigned to each criterion by different decision makers can result in 
inconsistent decisions across institutional lines.”67  Instead CEJA 
recommends five factors that should be considered in allocation of scarce 
resources such as organs including: 
(1) the likelihood of benefit to the patient 
(2) the impact of treatment in improving the quality of the patient’s life 
(3) the duration of benefit 
(4) the urgency of the patient’s condition (i.e., how close the patient is 
to death), and 
(5) the amount of resources required for successful treatment.68 
These recommendations have yet to be fully considered, embraced, or 
implemented by UNOS. 
 
 63.  About Transplantation: Transplant Process, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/learn/about-transplantation/transplant-process/ (last visited Oct. 19, 
2014). 
 64.  Saletan, supra note 5. 
 65.  Id.  See also, Family Sues Insurer Who Denied Teen Transplant, NBC News (Dec. 21, 
2007 6:05 PM) http://www.nbcnews.com/id/22357873/ns/health-health_care/t/family-sues-
insurer-who-denied-teen-transplant/#.Uzoso8tOWM8 (discussing case of teen who died prior to 
obtaining insurance approval for coverage of transplant). 
 66.  E.g., Study Shows ‘Gaming’ in Heart Transplant System, Science Daily (Mar. 9, 2004), 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2004/03/040309072201.htm.  Another type of gaming is 
transplant centers exaggerating the severity of a potential recipient’s symptoms to increase the 
chances of obtaining an organ for transplantation.  See id. 
 67.  Ethical Considerations in the Allocation of Organs and Other Scarce Medical Resources 
Among Patients, Am. Med. Ass’n (1993), http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/code-medical-
ethics/216a.pdf. 
 68.  Id. 
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When an individual is listed at a transplant center, he or she is generally 
considered for organs from a donor in that local area first.69  If a patient is 
put on the list at multiple transplant centers, then he or she will be considered 
for donated organs that become available in multiple local areas.70  Although 
the policy allows for multiple listing in the same local area, because each 
OPO has a defined service area71 and there is a limit to designating one OPO 
to each service area,72 there appears to be no advantage to listing at multiple 
centers in the same OPO.73  Each region may establish regional review 
boards (RRBs) for specific organs to provide “confidential medical peer 
review of transplant candidates placed on the waiting list at a more urgent 
status than the standard listing criteria justifies.”74  The RRBs may then 
decide whether the requested status is appropriate following a review of the 
justification forms submitted by the transplant center documenting the 
candidate’s current condition.75  Transplant hospitals are to ensure that 
individuals are placed on the transplant waiting list as soon as his or her 
candidacy for transplantation has been determined.76 
C. Allocation Enigma 
When a deceased organ donor is identified the OPO accesses the UNet 
system, the centralized UNOS computer network that electronically links all 
transplant hospitals and OPOs, which then generates a ranked list or match 
run of candidates who are suitable to receive the organ.77 
 
 69.  About Transplantation: Transplant Process, supra note 63. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  42 U.S.C. § 273 (2014). 
 72.  42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8 (2014). 
 73.  Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 57. 
 74.  OPTN Bylaws Article IX § 9.3, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HEUMAN SERVS. (effective as of 
Feb. 2014), http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Bylaws.pdf. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  42 C.F.R. § 121.5 (2014). 
 77.   Before the Transplant: About Organ Allocation, TransplantLiving.org, http://www.trans 
plantliving.org/before-the-transplant/about-organ-allocation/matching-organs/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). 
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Figure 3 Before the Transplant: About Organ Allocation, TransplantLiving.org, http://www.transplantliving.org/before-
the-transplant/about-organ-allocation/matching-organs/. 
Factors affecting candidate ranking include tissue match, blood type, 
length of time on the waiting list, immune status, distance between the 
potential recipient and the donor, and degree of medical urgency (for heart, 
liver, lung and intestines).78  OPTN is clear that for each organ that becomes 
available, UNet’s ranking of potential recipients is based on the objective 
criteria specific to that organ.79  OPTN further states that “[e]thnicity, gender, 
religion, and financial status are not part of the computer matching 
system.”80 
UNOS has a national distribution policy for most organs, relying on 
medical urgency and waitlist time for allocation.81  “Prior to 2000, UNOS 
policy was to retain organs in the geographic area where they were recovered 
if a transplant candidate with the appropriate medical status was in that area, 
even if patients with a more urgent need or who presented better survival 
prospects waited in other regions.”82  The justification for organ retention in 
 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Donor Matching System, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., http://optn.transplant. 
hrsa.gov/learn/about-transplantation/donor-matching-system/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2014). 
 80.  Id. (emphasis in original).  But see, Racial and Geographic Disparity in the Distribution 
of Organs for Transplantation, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. Office of the Inspector 
Gen. OEI-01-98-00360 (June 1998), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-98-
00360.pdf (indicating that racial and geographic disparities exist in waitlist times). 
 81.  Furrow et al., supra note 32, at 1488.  
 82.  Id. 
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local geographic areas is organ viability.83  The distance between the donor’s 
hospital and the potential recipient’s hospital is more important for matching 
hearts and lungs than it is for kidneys or livers because the heart and lungs 
can survive outside the body for only four to six hours while kidneys can 
survive up to thirty-six hours and livers up to twelve.84 
Each organ type has a specific allocation policy.85  Distinct allocation 
calculators are utilized for each type of organ.86  The allocation of hearts, 
livers, lungs, and kidneys all include special pediatric provisions whereas 
allocation of intestines and pancreas do not.87  The allocation of kidneys, the 
organ in highest demand, is done “locally first, then regionally, and then 
nationally.”88  This clearly encourages individuals in need of a kidney 
transplant to engage in multiple listing to increase his or her chances of 
transplantation.  Unfortunately, multiple listing is not a realistic option for 
everyone.89  Even the purported objective criteria used to determine organ 
allocation include a level of subjectivity that may exacerbate inequities in 
organ distribution.  For instance, the Calculated Panel Reactive Antibody 
(CPRA) is one of the three allocation calculators used to identify kidney 
candidates,90 and is used to estimate the percentage of likely incompatible 
donors based on the candidates’ unacceptable antigens.91  Discretion is left 
to the transplant centers to determine their own criteria for unacceptable 
antigens.92  Each transplant center may specify the minimum acceptance 
criteria for a deceased donor organ and maximum antigen mismatch.93  If the 
transplant program specifies a mismatched antigen maximum, then the OPO 
will only offer organs from deceased donors with mismatched antigens equal 
to or less than the maximum specified.94  Thus a potential candidate may be 
 
 83.  See Organ Matching Process, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/about/ 
organmatching.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  OPTN Policies §§ 6 - 11, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. (Mar. 7, 2014), 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Policies.pdf. 
 86.  Allocation Calculators, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., http://optn.transplant. 
hrsa.gov/converge/resources/allocationcalculators.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
 87.  OPTN Policies §§ 6 - 11, supra note 85. 
 88.  OPTN Policy § 8.5B, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. (Mar. 7, 2014), 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Policies.pdf. 
 89.  See discussion supra Section III.B. 
 90.  Allocation Calculators, supra  note 86. 
 91.  About CPRA for Professionals, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., http://optn.transplant. 
hrsa.gov/converge/resources/allocationcalculators.asp?index=77 (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  OPTN Policy § 5.2, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. (Mar. 7, 2014), 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Policies.pdf. 
 94.  Id. 
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determined to not be a match at one transplant center, but at another 
transplant center would be a match. 
The lung allocation system for candidates twelve years of age and older 
is based upon a lung allocation score (LAS).95  Donor lungs are offered to 
candidates according to their medical characteristics, directing lungs to 
candidates with the most urgent medical need and the greatest chance of 
survival, instead of relying on waitlist time.96  The measures used to calculate 
the LAS are: waiting list urgency measure, or the expected number of days 
a candidate will live without a transplant during an additional year on the 
waiting list; the post-transplant survival measure, or the expected number of 
days a candidate will live during the first year post-transplant; the transplant 
benefit measure, or the difference between the post-transplant survival 
measure and the waiting list urgency measure; and the raw allocation score, 
which is the difference between transplant benefit measure and waiting list 
urgency measure.97  These measures are then plugged into an equation 
specified by the OPTN to determine an individual’s LAS.98  Priority is given 
to candidates based on his or her LAS, blood type, and the geographic 
distance between the candidate and the donor hospital.99  Age factors in only 
so far in as lungs from pediatric and adolescent donors are offered first to 
pediatric and adolescent transplant candidates before they are offered to 
adults.100 
Prior to June 10, 2013, lung candidates younger than twelve years old 
were sorted based on pediatric priority waiting time and total waiting time, 
longest to shortest.101  The pediatric candidates were assigned as priority one 
and priority two.102  Priority one was assigned to pediatric candidates with 
respiratory failure, pulmonary hypertension, or as an exception granted by 
the Lung Review Board (LRB).103  All other pediatric candidates were 
 
 95.  Frequently Asked Questions About the Lung Allocation System (LAS), HEALTH RES. & 
SERVS. ADMIN.,  http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/converge/resources/allocationcalculators. 
asp?index=86 (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  OPTN Policy § 10.5, The LAS Calculation. (Mar. 7, 2014), http://optn.transplant. 
hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Policies.pdf#nameddest=Policy_8_Allocation_of_Kidneys. 
 98.  See id. 
 99.  Frequently Asked Questions About the Lung Allocation System (LAS), supra note 95. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  OPTN Policy § 10.4, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. (Mar. 7, 2014), 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Policies.pdf. 
 102.  OPTN Policy § 3.7.6.2, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. (old policy as of Sept. 1, 
2013), http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Policies_Old.pdf.  
 103.  Id. 
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assigned priority two.104  Within each priority blood type and then waitlist 
time were used to identify eligible candidates.105 
Following Murnaghan and Acosta’s involvement of the judicial system 
to obtain an advantage over others on the pediatric waitlist, OPTN 
reevaluated its pediatric allocation policy and has temporarily approved a 
policy permitting pediatric lung candidates to request an exception from the 
LRB to be classified as an adolescent to be prioritized by LAS.106  This 
“adolescent classification exception” is due to expire on July 1, 2014.107  
However, the OPTN Thoracic Committee is considering permanent 
implementation of the policy change as it allows for pediatric candidates who 
are suitable for lung offers from larger donors to apply for an exception.108 
Some may argue that what Murnaghan and Acosta did through judicial 
intervention was justified in that it spurred a change in the pediatric lung 
allocation policy.  However, the issue still remains that the system was 
changed for these specific individuals to obtain an advantage for 
transplantation resulting in a disadvantage to another individual on the 
waitlist.109  The stated goal is to provide equitable allocation of organs 
amongst potential recipients,110 but the question remains as to how this can 
best be achieved. 
IV. National Distribution 
The OPTN uses geographical areas for organ allocation including DSA, 
region, nation, and zones.  Although UNet centralizes the organ transplant 
system, the distribution of organs is initially at a local level and then 
expanded to a broader geographic area if the organ is not matched or is 
declined in the local area.111  Thus, although OPTN is charged with 
establishing a national list of individuals in need of organs,112 the national 
list is simply the names of the individuals in need of transplantation 
 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Proposal for Adolescent Classification Exception for Pediatric Lung Candidates, supra 
note 13. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Allahpundit, supra note 20. 
 110.  42 C.F.R. § 121.8 (2014). 
 111.  See OPTN Policy § 2.1, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. (Mar. 7, 2014), 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Policies.pdf (stating “Each organ 
procurement organization (OPO) must establish criteria for an acceptable deceased donor or 
deceased donor organ for the transplant programs in its Donation Service Area (DSA). If a host 
OPO rejects a deceased donor, the OPO must offer the organs to OPOs that have more liberal 
acceptance criteria.”). 
 112.  42 U.S.C. § 274 (2014).   
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nationwide.  The national system that is alluded to is actually just general 
criteria set out by UNOS and OPTN that centers are to rely on in matching 
donors and candidates as well as for allocation purposes.  But there is much 
discretion left to the OPOs and the transplant centers. 
The idea of a national transplant list has been discussed as far back as 
when NOTA was first passed.  Although Congress called for OPTN to 
“establish one nationwide list of individuals awaiting transplantation and a 
national system that would allow for donated organs to be quickly matched 
with medically suitable candidates on that list” national distribution was not 
mandated.113  Rather than establishing a national list and a national system 
in one central location, it specified this could occur in regional centers.114  
For instance, transplant programs have discretion in establishing criteria for 
organ acceptance.115  Thus one transplant center may accept organs that 
another would decline. 
The arguments against a national list include the likely increase in need 
for cross-country transportation of organs, prolonging ischemia times and 
resulting in the wastage of donated organs, increased re-transplantation rates, 
fewer transplanted candidates and more waitlist deaths.116  However, 
currently multiple listing is allowed requiring cross-country transportation 
of the individual requiring transplantation. Thus, individuals who can afford 
it are able to travel to a distant transplant center to obtain the donated organ.  
Organ survivability will likely not be affected whether it is the organ 
travelling from the donor hospital to the recipient hospital or the individual 
in need of transplant travelling across the country because the organ is 
outside of a human body for the same duration.  Implementing a system 
whereby organs are distributed nationally and the organ travels from the 
donor hospital to the recipient hospital would be more equitable than the 
current system allowing for those who can afford it to be listed at multiple 
transplant centers. 
A national system with uniform policies and standards is essential to a 
more equitable distribution system.117 
 
 113.  Mark R. Yessian, Testimony on Organ Donation, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. 
(Apr. 8, 1998), http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t980408b.html. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  42 C.F.R. § 121.6 (2014). 
 116.  Neal R. Barshes, Carl S. Hacker, Richard B. Freeman Jr., John M. Vierling & John A. 
Goss, Justice, Administrative Law and the Transplant Clinician: The Ethical and Legislative Basis 
of a National Policy on Donor Liver Allocation, 23 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 200, 218 
(2007). 
 117.  Yessian, supra note 114. 
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V. Reducing the Waitlist 
A. HIV Organ Policy Equity Act 
The HIV Organ Policy Equity (HOPE) Act enacted November 2013 
allows for the transplantation of organs from donors infected with HIV to 
recipients who are infected with HIV.118  It is estimated that 500 individuals 
infected with HIV will be eligible for transplants annually.119  This will in 
turn reduce waitlists for individuals not infected with HIV.120  OPTN has 
convened a workgroup to develop criteria for conducting research on organs 
procured from HIV-positive individuals in order to assess the feasibility, 
effectiveness, and safety of transplantation of HIV infected organs.121  
Although this is a promising step in the right direction, the shortage of organs 
will not be alleviated through this measure alone. 
B. Opt-in versus Opt-out 
The UAGA adheres to an opt-in principle whereby an “individual 
becomes a donor only if the donor or someone acting on the donor’s behalf 
affirmatively makes an anatomical gift.”122  This is contrary to an opt-out 
standard whereby consent is presumed “rendering all persons de facto organ 
donors unless they choose to expressly opt-out.”123  Some argue that an opt-
out standard may help increase organ donation.124  However, this does not 
appear to be the case in Europe, where many countries have adopted the 
presumed consent standard but do not have better donation rates than the 
United States.125  This may be because even with the presumed consent laws, 
explicit approval is still required.126  If the U.S. instituted presumed consent 
 
 118.  113 P.L. 51 codified in 42 U.S.C. § 274 (2014). 
 119.  New Law Offers Hope to HIV-Infected Patients Awaiting Organ Transplants, JOHNS 
HOPKINS NEWS RELEASE (November 21, 2013), http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/ 
media/releases/_new_law_offers_hope_to_hiv_infected_patients_awaiting_organ_transplants. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Work Group to Address OPTN Policy Relating to HIV-positive Organ Recovery, HEALTH 
RES. & SERVS. ADMIN. (Mar. 27, 2014), http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/news/work-group-to-
address-optn-policy-relating-to-hiv-positive-organ-recovery/. 
 122.  Unif. Anatomical Gift Act (2006), supra note 26, at 2. 
 123.  Sara Naomi Rodriguez, Comment, No Means No, But Silence Means Yes? The Policy & 
Constitutionality of the Recent State Proposals for Opt-Out Organ Donation Laws, 7 FIU L. REV. 
149, 151, 156, 157 (2011).  For information on a third organ procurement standard mandated 
choice, see id. at 156–57. 
 124.  Furrow et al., supra note 32, at 1491. 
 125.  Henry Hansmann, Markets for Human Organs, in A Legal Framework for Bioethics 145 
(Cosimo Marco Mazzoni et al., eds., 1998). 
 126.  Id. 
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laws, in which strictly enforced and explicitly held approval is not required, 
then the donor pool would potentially see an increase. 
C. Compensation for Donation 
United States law prohibits the sale of human organs.127  This stems 
from ethical and moral values as well as fear of the poor being taken 
advantage of.128  However, due to the scarcity of organs available for 
transplantation, those who can afford it seek solutions outside of U.S. 
borders.129  The phenomenon whereby individuals who have the means go to 
another country where organ purchase is permitted, or at least not 
specifically prohibited, transplant tourism is on the rise due to organ 
shortages.130  Some medical professionals are concerned about the sub-
standard care the organ recipients may be receiving.131  In one case, someone 
who had gone to China for transplantation, returned for follow-up care to his 
providers in the U.S.132, 133  Shortly thereafter, he became septic, was 
hospitalized, and ultimately transplanted again in the U.S.134  There was 
some disagreement amongst the transplant team whether it was morally right 
to provide him with a transplant, but the consensus was to proceed based on 
the nonjudgmental regard and beneficence principles of medical ethics.135  
Thus, not only did this individual go to another country and purchase an 
 
 127.  42 U.S.C. § 274 (2014). 
 128.  See generally Erica D. Roberts, When The Storehouse is Empty, Unconscionable 
Contracts Abound: Why Transplant Tourism Should Not be Ignored, 52 HOW. L.J. 747 (2009). 
 129.  See generally Robert Ainley, Organ Transploitation: A Model Law Approach to Combat 
Human Trafficking & Transplant Tourism, 13 OR. REV. INT’L L. 427 (2011); Jacqueline Bowden, 
Feeling Empty? Organ Trafficking & Trade: The Black Market for Human Organs, 8 Intercultural 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 451 (2013); Jennifer M. Smith, Dirty Pretty Things & The Law: Curing The 
Organ Shortage & Health Care Crises In America, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 361 (2008). 
 130.  Laura MacInnis, “Transplant tourism” On Rise Due to Donor Shortages, REUTERS (Mar. 
30, 2007, 1:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/03/30/us-transplants-idUSL3042 
128920070330. 
 131.  Transplant Tourism Poses Ethical Dilemma for US Doctors, SCIENCE DAILY (Jan. 27, 
2010), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/01/100126133354.htm. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  For discussion on China’s program harvesting organs from prisoners which is now being 
phased out see Michelle Castillo, China to Stop Harvesting Organs From Executed Prisoners, CBS 
NEWS (Aug. 16, 2013, 3:58 PM) http://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-to-stop-harvesting-organs-
from-executed-prisoners/; Li Hui and Ben Blanchard, China to Phase Out Use of Prisoners’ 
Organs for Transplants, REUTERS (Aug. 15, 2013, 8:28 AM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2013/08/15/us-china-organs-idUSBRE97E09920130815; Calum MacLeod, Organ 
Harvesting Changes in China Will be Tough to Realize, USA TODAY (Updated May 15, 2012, 9:47 
AM) http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-05-14/china-organ-transplant-ban/ 
54964098/1. 
 134.  Transplant Tourism Poses Ethical Dilemma for US Doctors, supra note 131. 
 135.  Id. 
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organ that could have gone to someone else, when that transplant failed, he 
ended up requiring another transplant in the U.S. 
There are also the ethical considerations regarding paid organ donors—
many of whom are poor and do not receive adequate follow-up care.136  
Individuals, who sell their organs or tissue, are referred to as vendors.137  One 
study conducted on vendors in Pakistan revealed that all but two of the thirty-
four subjects had “sold a kidney to pay off debts owed to landowners, or to 
pay for medical expenses, burial of the dead, or dowries related to 
marriage.”138  The vendors felt as though they lacked other options and 
turned to selling an organ, which opponents of organ sales say is a 
perpetuation of social and economic inequality rather than the vendor 
exercising the freedom to make an autonomous choice.139  In some cases, the 
vendors did not even receive the promised payment that led him or her to 
agree to selling the organ in the first place.140, 141 
Iran has legalized the sale of organs.142  Living non-related donation of 
kidneys was legalized in 1988 and a government-organized transplantation 
system was established to regulate and fund the transplant process as well as 
compensate donors for organs.143  The Dialysis and Transplant Patients 
Association, a third-party independent association, was established to 
arrange contact between donors and recipients and still carries out this 
function while staffed on a voluntary basis by end-stage renal failure 
patients.144  It is illegal for the medical and surgical teams involved in the 
transplant to receive any form of payment.145  The donors receive free health 
 
 136.  MacInnis, supra note 131. 
 137.  Caroline Helwick, WCN 2009: Sale of Kidney Leaves Vendors Regretful, Depressed, 
MEDSCAPE (May 26, 2009), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/703311. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  See Rob Verger, Israel’s Campaign To Halt Organ Trafficking Tourism, THE DAILY 
BEAST (Mar. 18, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/03/18/israel-s-campaign-to-
halt-organ-trafficking-tourism.html. 
 141.  For discussion on the prolific organ purchase system in Israel see Michael Finkel, This 
Little Kidney Went to Market, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE (May 27, 2001), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/27/magazine/27ORGAN.html?pagewanted=all (“[T]here have 
been instances in which a patient has elected not to accept the offer of a kidney donation from a 
well-matched relative.  ‘Why risk harm to a family member?’ one patient told me. Instead, these 
patients have decided that purchasing a kidney from someone they’ve never met—in almost all 
cases someone who is impoverished and living in a foreign land—is a far more palatable option.”). 
 142.  Rupert Major, Paying Kidney Donors: Time to Follow Iran?, MCGILL JOURNAL OF MED. 
Volume 11(1) 67-69 (Jan. 2008), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
pmc/articles/PMC2322914/#b2-mjm11_1p67. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
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insurance and the recipients are provided with subsidized 
immunosuppression.146  To prevent transplant tourism, Iran has outlawed 
potential recipients from abroad travelling to Iran to receive a kidney 
donation from an Iranian.147  It appears that Iran may have successfully 
addressed the shortage of organs with reported outcomes for recipients being 
favorable.148  However, opponents of the Iranian system indicate that there 
are still substantial waiting times for organs and that the poor are still the 
ones being preyed upon for donations.149 
The U.S. prohibition on organ sales does not include “the reasonable 
payments associated with the removal, transportation, implantation, 
processing, preservation, quality control, and storage of a human organ or 
the expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the donor of a 
human organ in connection with the donation of the organ.”150  This is 
consistent with the view of the American Medical Association,151 and may 
actually serve to encourage living donation.152 
The concerns of the poor being forced into donation due to dire 
circumstances are primarily regarding living donors.  However, there may 
be a market for cadaveric organs.153  One idea for a cadaveric organ market 
is a futures market.154  The right to harvest an individual’s organs upon the 
individual’s death would be purchased in advance while the individual is 
alive and in good health.155  This could be done through health insurance 
companies.156  The inducement would be a lower insurance premium for 
 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Saeed Kamali Deghan, Kidneys for Sale: Poor Iranians Compete to Sell Their Organs, 
THE GUARDIAN (May 27, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/27/iran-
legal-trade-kidney. 
 149.   Major, supra note 143.  But see Deghan, supra note 149 (“As a result, there is no shortage 
of the organs—but for those trying to sell a kidney, there is a lot of competition.”); Benjamin E. 
Hippen, Organ Sales and Moral Travails Lessons from the Living Kidney Vendor Program in Iran, 
POLICY ANALYIS No. 614 (Mar. 20, 2008), (“[O]nly one country in the world doesn’t suffer from 
an organ shortage: Iran.”). 
 150.  42 U.S.C. § 274(e). 
 151.  Policy E-2.15 Transplantation of Organs from Living Donors, Am. Med. Ass’n, 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-
ethics/opinion215.page? (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). 
 152.  The U.S. allows for compensation for blood, sperm, egg, and more recently, bone marrow 
donations.  See generally Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2011); Doug Mataconis, Federal 
Court Legalizes Compensation For Bone Marrow Donors, OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY (Dec. 3, 2011), 
http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/federal-court-legalizes-compensation-for-bone-marrow-
donors/. 
 153.  Hansmann, supra note 126, at 145. 
 154.  Id. at 147. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  See id. at 147-49. 
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those who agree to donate, or alternatively a penalty for those who decline 
to donate.157  However, it is unlikely that penalizing an individual for 
refusing to donate would be Constitutional as it infringes on an individual’s 
liberty, autonomy, and privacy.158  Another more realistic option is to have 
the state purchase the rights when an individual is obtaining or renewing a 
driver’s license or state identification through a reduction in the fee for the 
license or identification.159  All states have legal consent driver’s license 
donor designation provisions.160  Hence, the foundation for implementing 
future markets in cadaveric organs exists and only determination of price or 
premium reduction need be considered.161 
VI. Conclusion 
Organs are a scarce resource and as such require equitable distribution 
policies to ensure a just allocation system.  While UNOS and OPTN are 
charged with oversight of the transplant system to ensure equitable 
distribution of the life-saving organs, much discretion is left to OPOs and 
transplant centers, resulting in variations in listing and distribution criteria.  
Allowing for multiple listing only serves to exacerbate the inequities 
inherent in the system. 
One solution could be to fully embrace a national distribution system.  
Another option to reduce the waitlist includes the recently passed HOPE Act 
which could ultimately permit HIV-positive donor to HIV-positive recipient 
transplantation, resulting in reduction of the waitlist for individuals not 
infected with HIV.  Lastly, considering compensation for both living donors 
modelled after the Iranian system, and cadaveric donors in a futures market 
framework may serve to reduce the ever-widening gap between donors and 
those in need of transplants. 
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